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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal is from a final Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable L.A. Dever, presiding. The Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard G. Fordham, appealed
to this Court, which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a). This Court,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's Order Granting

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and issued its written Opinion on February 16,
2006. Appellant petitioned to this Court for a writ of certiorari which was granted as to the
following issue: "Whether the court of appeals correctly adopted the 'professional rescuer
doctrine' and correctly delineated the rationale supporting it and its scope of application."
This Court now has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a).
n.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The sole issue presented for review is: "Whether the court of appeals correctly
adopted the 'professional rescuer doctrine' and correctly delineated the rationale supporting
it and its scope of application."
(STANDARD OF REVIEW)
When the Utah Supreme Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction, it reviews a
decision of the court of appeals, not a decision of the trial court, and the Supreme Court
does not grant certiorari to review de novo the trial court's decision. See Butterfield v.
1

Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of
appeal's decision and is further circumscribed by the issue raised in the petition for
certiorari. See Colter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852 (Utah 1998). When
exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals for correctness and applies the same standard of review used by the court
of appeals. See State ex rel. W.A., 63 P.3d 100 (Utah 2002).

qSSUE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL)
The issue as to which certiorari has been granted was preserved for appeal pursuant
to the issuance of the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, a copy of which is included in
the Addendum to Appellant's Brief. In reviewing the court of appeals' opinion, the Utah
Supreme Court applies the same standard of review used by the court of appeals.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves application of the professional rescuer doctrine which prevents
firefighters and police officers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment
from recovery based on negligent conduct that requires their presence and assistance. The
district court granted Defendant-Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of
the professional rescuer doctrine and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Order
Granting Summary Judgment issued by the district court.
The facts are undisputed. Appellant Ryan Oldroyd ("Oldroyd") was involved in a
single-car rollover accident on December 28, 2003 on the eastbound 600 South offramp
2

from 1-15 in Salt Lake City, Utah, when he lost control of his vehicle as he encountered
snow and/or ice. (R.2). Following Oldroyd's accident, both Utah Highway Patrol troopers
and Salt Lake City police officers responded to the scene. Among the Utah Highway Patrol
troopers responding was the Plaintiff, Richard G. Fordham ("Fordham"). When Fordham
arrived on the scene, two other highway patrol troopers were already there, as well as one or
more Salt Lake City police officers. (R.57). Fordham positioned his vehicle in the number
two eastbound travel lane, and after doing so went to the rear of his highway patrol vehicle
to retrieve flares. (R.56-58). While doing so, Fordham was struck by another vehicle
driven by Zhi Wu which encountered ice and/or snow and lost control. (R.42-43). At the
time Fordham was struck, Oldroyd had been assisted from his vehicle and was in another
officer's carfillingout paperwork. (R.62-63).
Subsequent to the accident Fordham settled with Zhi Wu, the driver of the vehicle
which struck him, for her liability insurance policy limits of $50,000.00. Fordham also
received Worker's Compensation benefits through his employment with the Utah Highway
Patrol. Appellant's Brief at 6. Fordhamfiledthis action seeking damagesfromOldroyd for
his alleged negligence in connection with the subject incident on December 28, 2003.
Following the parties' depositions, Oldroyd filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on the
basis that the professional rescuer doctrine prohibits Fordham from maintaining his action
against Oldroyd for injuries sustained when Fordham was struck by another driver while he
was at the scene of Oldroyd's accident in the course and scope of his employment with the
3

Utah Highway Patrol. (R.39-87). After oral argument conducted on March 16, 2005, the
district court granted Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 163-64). Oldroyd
appealed to this Court, which poured the case over to the Utah Court of appeals. (R.173).
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion affirming the district court's grant of
summary judgment on February 16, 2006. (Addendum to Appellant's Brief at 3-15)
Appellant petitioned for certiorari with this Court which petition was granted on May 24,
2006.
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The district court and, in turn, the court of appeals, properly determined that the
professional rescuer doctrine bars Plaintiff-Appellant's claim against Defendant-Appellee
in this case. While application of the professional rescuer doctrine appears to be an issue of
first impression in Utah, the overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions that have addressed the
issue have adopted the professional rescuer doctrine, which provides that firefighters and
police officers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment may not
recover based on negligent conduct that requires their presence and assistance. The
professional rescuer doctrine recognizes that law enforcement officers, such as Fordham, as
part of their profession, are paid to and voluntarily confront hazards causing injury in return
for compensation. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that, as a matter of
public policy, Utah should join the majority of states that have adopted the professional
rescuer doctrine.
4

V.

ARGUMENT

The professional rescuer doctrine, which was the basis of the district court's Order
Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and of the Utah Court of Appeal's
Opinion affirming the same, has been defined as follows:
The "Fireman's Rule" [referred to as the professional rescuer doctrine by the
Utah Court of appeals] is a widely recognized rule which, where it is
followed, prevents firefighters and police officers injured in the course of
their dutiesfromrecoveringfromthose whose negligence proximately caused
their injuries or from the owner or occupant of premises who is responsible
for creating the condition requiring their presence on the property. The
Fireman's Rule has been applied to preclude recovery against negligent
motorists for injuries sustained by police officers which were reasonably
foreseeable in the course of their duties on the highway. The rule is
applicable where a police officer is responding to or investigating an
automobile accident and where an officer is injured as a result of a motorist's
actions in negligently stopping on a highway.
Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §691.
The professional rescuer doctrine is based upon sound public policy considerations,
and has been adopted by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered
it. For example, in Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co.. 894 S.W.2d 913 (Ark. 1995) (R. 135140), the Arkansas Supreme Court, in a case adopting the "almost universally accepted"
professional rescuer doctrine, noted that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia
had adopted the rule while only three states had rejected it either by case law or statute. Six
years later, in Moody v. Delta Western, Inc., 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002) (R. 142-46), the
Alaska Supreme Court joined the overwhelming majority of states that have adopted the
professional rescuer doctrine. In that case, the court noted that, "Nearly all of the courts that
have considered whether or not to adopt the Fireman's Rule have in fact adopted it." Ld. at
1140. The court went on to cite casesfromthirty-two jurisdictions adopting the rule, while
5

only noting one jurisdiction, Oregon, which had rejected it.
Public policy considerations supporting the professional rescuer doctrine have been
discussed in numerous cases from many jurisdictions. For example, in Steelman v. Lind,
634 P.2d 666 (Nev. 1981) (R. 66-68), the Nevada Supreme Court, in a case factually similar
to this case, held that the professional rescuer doctrine barred an action by a highway patrol
trooper against a vehicle owner who had stopped on an interstate roadway to reload
beehives that had slipped off a trailer. After positioning highwayflares,the highway patrol
trooper, Steelman, was rearended and injured by a vehicle operated by another individual.
The Court stated:
Such officers, in accepting the salary andfringebenefits offered for the job,
assume all normal risks inherent in the employment as a matter of law and
thus may not recover from one who negligently creates such risk. See e.g.
Maltmanv. Sauer. 84 Wash.2d 975, 530 P.2d 254 (1975); Burden v. Midwest
Indus., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Ky. 1964). If this were not the rule, citizens
would be reluctant to seek aid of a public safety officer or to have such aid
sought in their behalf upon fear that a subsequent claim for injury by the
officer might be far more damaging than the initial fire or assault. To hold
otherwise would create far too severe a burden upon homeowners in keeping
their premises reasonably safe for the unexpected arrivals of police and
firemen.

It was the duty of Steelman, a highway patrol trooper, to take affirmative
action to protect anyone found in a precarious situation upon the highway
from additional harm. Action, such as that taken by Steelman, on behalf of
Lind, a motorist in distress, as well as other motorists travelling upon the
highway, forms a part of what troopers are hired to do and falls directly under
the ordinary course of the duties of the occupation.

For the reasons expressed above, we hold that as a matter of law, appellant is
6

barred by the Fireman's Rule from maintaining an action against Lind and
affirm the summary judgment.
634 P.2d at 427-29.
In Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co.. 569 A.2d 1173 (D.C. App. 1990), the District of
Columbia Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants in a suit
involving afirefighterwho was injured in an attempt to catch a truck driver as he fellfroma
bridge. Commenting on the rationale supporting the professional rescuer doctrine, the
Court stated:
The professional rescuer doctrine (characterized in some jurisdictions as
the^eman's rule") generally bars those whose business it is to prevent injury
and save lives from tort recovery for injuries sustained from known hazards
in the course of their work. Gillespie, 395 A.2d at 20,21. While the doctrine
originally developed in other jurisdictions in the context of landowner
liability law, see Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 203, 142 Ca. Reptr. 152,
154, 571 P.2d 609, 611 (1977), the modem rationale for the doctrine-indeed,
its basis in the District of Columbia-is that a professional rescuer has
assumed the risks of his or her employment and is compensated accordingly
by the public, both in pay and in worker's compensation benefits in the event
of injury, Gillespie, 395 A.2d at 20. While the reality may be that a
professional rescuer's pay and benefits are often inadequate to compensate for
a given injury, the fact remains that a professional rescuer knows before
accepting the employment both what the risks of the job are and what the
compensation and benefits will be. The professional rescuer doctrine also
seeks to avoid a potential proliferation of lawsuits, and thus represents a
policy decision that the tort system is an inappropriate mechanism for
compensating professional rescuers injured in the course of their inherently
risky employment.
Young, 589 A.2d at 1175.
In Miller v. Inglis. 567 N.W.2d 253 (Mich. App. 1997), the Michigan Court of
appeals, commenting on the professional rescuer doctrine stated:
7

Courts in many jurisdictions throughout the United States have adopted a
common-law rule that bars public safety officials such as firefighters and
police officers from suing tortfeasors for injuries sustained in the course of
the public safety officer's employment. The "professional rescuers rule," or
"the fireman's rule", as it is called in Michigan, Kreskj supra at 357-358,415
N.W.2d 178, is a creature of the common law, and as such, it has been
defined and refined case by case. Courts have cited several reasons to justify
the firemans1 rule—these include the view that (1) rescue officers know the
dangers of the job when they apply for it, (2) the purpose of the public safety
profession is to confront danger, and (3) the public should not be held liable
for damages or injuries that arise from the function that police officers and
firefighters are intended to fulfill. Kreski supra at 368,415 N.W.2d 178[.]
567 N.W.2d at 162-63.
The dissent, in a case cited by Appellant, Lave v. Newmann, 317 N.W. 2d 779 (Neb.
1982) (R. 107-09), eloquently stated the purposes for and public policy supporting the
professional rescuer doctrine as follows:
The Fireman's Rule has withstood attack in other jurisdictions from those
who misunderstand its genesis and underlying policy. See Walters v. Sloan,
20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609,142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977), which noted that the
principle denying recovery to those voluntarily undertaking the hazard
causing injury is fundamental in a number of doctrines, including nullification
of the duty of care, satisfaction of the duty to warn because the hazard is
known, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, as well as in the
fireman's rule. The rule finds its clearest application in a situation where a
person who, fully aware of the hazard created by the defendant's negligence,
voluntarily confronts the risk for compensation. Firemen and policemen are
paid for the work they perform and are prepared to face the hazards of their
employment and deal with perils when they arise. When death, injury, or
disability occurs, compensation is provided not only through the workman's
compensation law, but, in certain circumstances, by other special benefit
statutes.
317 N.W. 2d at 782-83 (Caporale, J., dissenting).

8

Fordham argues that the basic philosophy of Utah tort law and the provisions of the
Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to 43, require that each
tortfeasor must pay his or her share of damages caused to a plaintiff by negligence. (Br. at
14-16). While this is generally the case, there are exceptions in the Code, itself, for
negligent employers, employees, governmental entities and governmental employees.
These exceptions are based upon public policy reasons. Similarly, the overwhelming
majority of states that have adopted the professional rescuer doctrine have done so for valid
public policy reasons, and not merely under a limited "assumption of risk" analysis as
suggested by Fordham. In short, there is no violation of the basic philosophy of Utah tort
law created by application of the professional rescuer doctrine.
Likewise, the Worker's Compensation statutes, in particular Utah Code Ann. §34A2-106, are compatible with the professional rescuer doctrine. Fordham argues that because
an injured employee is allowed to sue a negligent third party for injuries sustained by the
employee while on the job, and no exception for firemen or police officers is set forth in the
statute, application of the Professional rescuer doctrine is inconsistent with this section.
(Br. at 15). This is not the case. Application of the professional rescuer doctrine precludes
a duty owed by a negligent citizen to a safety officer called to assist such citizen. In the
absence of a duty, the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act do not apply. The
statute states that an injured employee "...may have an action for damages against the third
person." (Emphasis added). With application to the professional rescuer doctrine, there is
no duty owed by the negligent citizen to the safety officer, and consequently, no valid claim
exists. Section 34A-2-106 does not mandate otherwise.
Fordham cites and quotesfivecases in support of his argument that this Court should
reject the professional rescuer doctrine. (Br. at 16-20). These cases constitute the extreme
9

minority. In Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984) (R. 99-105), the Oregon
Supreme Court found that the professional rescuer doctrine had been abolished by statute.
In Banvai v. Arruda. 799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990) (R. 118-20) and in Minnich v. MedWaste Inc., 654 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 2002) (R. 122-26), the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to adopt the professional rescuer doctrine.
Finally, in Lave v. Newmann. 317 N.W.2d 779 (Neb. 1982) (R. 107-09) and Levindoskvv.
Koehn, 841 A.2d 208 (Conn. 2004) (R. 111-16), the Supreme Courts of Nebraska and
Connecticut acknowledged the professional rescuer doctrine, but limited its scope to private
premises cases. In contrast, the vast majority of cases that have addressed the issue have
recognized the rationale behind the professional rescuer doctrine and have adopted it.
Finally, it should be pointed out that application of the professional rescuer doctrine
has not precluded Mr. Fordham from recovering damages from the individual who struck
him, and has not prevented him from receiving benefits under Worker's Compensation, a
system funded by the public, in place to compensate employees injured in the course and
scope of their employment. The professional rescuer doctrine precludes suits only against a
citizen whose ordinary negligence occasioned the presence of the public safety officer.
Independent acts of negligence that injure a safety officer at the scene, such as the
negligence of Zhi Wu, the driver who struck and injured Fordham, are not insulated from
suit. As the Supreme Court of Alaska noted in Moody, supra:
Jurisdictions adopting the Firefighter's Rule emphasize its narrowness; the
doctrine bars only recovery for the negligence that creates the need for the
public safety officer's service. (Footnote omitted.) Thus the Firefighter's
Rule does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the police officer or
firefighter arrives at the scene or to misconduct other than that which
necessitates the officer's presence. (Footnote omitted.)
10

Modem courts stress interrelated reasons, based on public policy, for the rule.
The negligent party is said to have no duty to the public safety officer to act
without negligence in creating the condition that necessitates the officer's
intervention because the officer is employed by the public to respond to such
conditions and receives compensation and benefits for the risks inherent in
such responses. Requiring members of the public to pay for injuries resulting
from such responses effectively imposes a double payment obligation on
them. Further, because negligence is at the root of many calls for public
safety officers, allowing recovery would compound the growth of litigation.
(Footnote omitted.) Courts find an analogy in cases in which a contractor is
injured while repairing a condition that necessitated his employment. In these
cases, the owner is under no duty to protect the contractor against risks arising
from the condition the contractor is hired to repair, and thus is not liable even
if the condition was the product of the owner's negligence.
Moody. 38 P.3d at 1141-42.
The professional rescuer doctrine is a common law recognition that public safety
officers, such as Fordham, accept compensation from the public for confronting hazards
and rendering assistance to individuals in need. The rule recognizes that citizens should be
free to summon help from professional rescuers without concern that they might later be
sued by the public safety officer if he or she happens to be injured while confronting a
hazard in the course and scope of his or her employment. To hold otherwise would
constitute a deterrant to citizens summoning help when in need, and would essentially
create a double recovery for public safety officers injured in the course of their employment
while receiving compensation for doing their jobs.
Finally, Appellant urges this Court to "correct" parts of the Utah Court of Appeals'
Opinion dealing with duty and causation. Appellant's Brief at 24-26. The court of appeals'
discussion of duty and causation contains no error requiring correction. The court of
appeals concluded that adoption of the professional rescuer doctrine in Utah cannot be
11

supported by a rationale based upon a theory of assumption of risk, but went on to note that
strong public policy arguments, not inconsistent with any legislative pronouncements, form
the basis for adoption of the rule. The court of appeals correctly determined that the
professional rescuer doctrine: ".. .recognizes a failure of an essential element of a claim for
negligence. The rule bars the rescuer's recovery 'for the very valid public policy reason that
the party or parties who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the
firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter was employed to confront.' " Utah
Court of Appeals Opinion at f 19. Citing Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., 894 S.W.2d 913,
915 (Ark. 1995).
Similarly, the court of appeals' discussion of proximate cause in the context of
Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 996 P.2d 531 (Utah 2000) requires no
correction. The court of appeals noted that in Steiner this Court found that the element of
causation could not be established where the negligence of a plaintiff occurred before the
engagement of a professional hired to remedy a situation. The court of appeals simply drew
an analogy to the facts of Steiner and the facts of the case before it where Mr. Oldroyd's
alleged negligence occurred before the direct act of negligence of the individual who
injured Mr. Fordham. Again, the court of appeals did not rely upon any negligence doctrine
previously found to be inconsistent with Utah's comparative fault statutes but rather relied
upon public policy considerations in finding that, under the professional rescuer doctrine, in
circumstances like those present here, where a police officer called to the scene of an
accident is injured by a third party, the professional rescuer doctrine bars a claim by the
officer against the person whose negligence resulted in the officer's presence at the scene.
The court of appeals went on to note the limited nature of the professional rescuer doctrine
in that it does not bar recovery for subsequent acts of negligence such as that committed by
12

Zhi Wu in this case, but simply precludes the finding of a duty owed by the negligent driver
to the professional rescuer.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Utah Court of Appeals correctly determined that the professional rescuer
doctrine is based upon sound public policy principles. Application of the professional
rescuer doctrine to the facts of this case negate any duty owed by Defendant-Appellee
Oldroyd to Plaintiff-Appellant Fordham, and the court of appeals, therefore, properly
upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee.
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